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ABSTRACT 
 This research evaluated the effectiveness of the MRAP-All-Terrain Vehicle 
(M-ATV), joint lightweight tactical vehicle, and the High Mobility Multi-purpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) using multi-criteria effectiveness analysis within the 
context of the USMC Marine operating concept and National Security and Defense 
strategies. The Marine Corps is resource constrained and must carefully allocate 
resources. Having three vehicles perform the same mission is not efficient, nor a proper 
use of taxpayer dollars. A model was developed that quantifies how well a vehicle 
performs given the criteria of mobility, transportability, and protection per the Marine 
Corps ground tactical vehicle strategy (GCTVS). The model also factored in the 
identified future adversary and threat environments, applied those performance measures 
to the projected portfolio mix, and assessed the total efficacy of the GCTVS weighted for 
the given threat environment. The model predicted a cumulative 10% increase in 
portfolio efficacy through 2030 by restricting HMMWV use in the Middle East and 
divesting from the M-ATV no later than fiscal year 2021. If applied to the current 
GCTVS, this research could reshape the long-term profile of the Marine Corps’ tactical 
wheeled vehicle fleet. The model developed could be applied to other Department of 
Defense portfolios to provide an objective quantitative measure beyond cost to evaluate 
and develop portfolio strategies. 
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Four U.S. Marines travel down a bumpy unimproved road somewhere in the middle 
of enemy-controlled territory on their way to a mission that could potentially loosen the 
grip of the enemy in the area. They are each wearing the latest flame-resistant uniform with 
infrared scattering technology underneath their lightweight small arms protective inserts 
plate carrier that will resist penetration by the 7.62mm projectile that is the preferred 
ammunition of the enemy. Communications with the rest of the platoon is encrypted and 
completely secure via the newest satellite communications technology, which also 
provides real-time geolocation tracking so leadership around the world can know exactly 
where the platoon’s elements are within 10 meters. The automatic rifleman is carrying the 
infantry automatic rifle capable of laying down accurate small arms fire at 800 rounds per 
minute out to 800 meters. The other Marines are carrying their individual rifles complete 
with the newest optics and laser sighting system to enable accurate engagement of enemy 
targets out to 500 meters. Their weaponry is more effective than the enemy’s by hundreds 
of meters, and their communications cannot be jammed. If struck by an enemy bullet, their 
protective equipment will save them. However, the vehicle they are riding in was designed 
40 years ago and can be defeated by a milk jug filled with the proper mixture of farm 
fertilizer and cleaning supplies. Now imagine these same four Marines survived this 
mission, and years later are on a similar mission, but this time on the narrow urban streets 
of Italy or Hong Kong. They learned their lesson last time, so now they are in the newest 
vehicle with the best armor protection, but to achieve this, it is twice a big and three times 
as heavy as their last vehicle and cannot fit down the streets. In both cases, the vehicles 
were designed for such a specific mission that they were not effective in anything but that 
mission and consequently, failed the mission at hand.  
In a perfect world with unlimited resources, the Marine Corps would simply buy the 
best vehicle for every mission type and use the appropriate vehicle as needed. However, in a 
resource-constrained world, every asset must be used to the greatest extent possible. The 
Marine Corps’ tactical vehicle fleet is no exception, and if it continues to chase niche vehicle 
capabilities, the chances of the two scenarios described happening will continue to rise. 
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A. PURPOSE 
This study examines the tactical vehicle strategy currently employed by the Marine 
Corps to identify inefficiencies or redundancies that may have been created given the recent 
publication of national and service-level strategy documents. By applying reasonable and 
logical evaluation methods, a recommendation can be made about the most effective 
combat tactical vehicle strategy within a resource-constrained environment. The study and 
conclusion will be organized to answer the following questions. 
Research question: Given the current Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy 
and the Marine Operating Concept, what is the proper portfolio mix to be most effective in 
the anticipated threat environment through FY30? 
Secondary questions: Is there a point in time at which the M-ATV or HMMWV 
will no longer be required as a tactical vehicle? If so, when? 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Multi-criteria effectiveness analysis was used to evaluate the vehicles currently 
employed under the Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) for overall 
effectiveness in a variety of regional environments. The total effectiveness model was 
based on three main criteria representing the key characteristics identified by the Marine 
Corps as essential for any vehicles to best support future operations (Walsh, 2018). The 
environments of concern were those identified by national leadership in the current 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) (Mattis, 2018; 
Trump 2017). The effectiveness of each vehicle was calculated to conduct a final analysis 
of the tactical vehicle strategy as currently written through fiscal year 2030 (FY30). Finally, 
the effectiveness scores were interpreted in the context of the three specific threat regions 
over time, which led to the final recommendation.  
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis report begins by providing some background information on the source 
documentation that is used as the basis for the study’s model. Additionally, background 
will be provided on each specific vehicle being evaluated. The background will be followed 
3 
by a short discussion on the technique of multi-criteria effectiveness analysis. The model 
will be developed and the origin and purpose of each objective and attribute explained. In 
the analysis section, the developed model will then be applied to the identified vehicles 
three times across the regions in question. The analysis section will be followed by the 
results section wherein sensitivity analysis is used to identify any changes in effectiveness 
if some subjective values and other assumptions are altered. Finally, a conclusion and an 
accompanying recommendation will be provided to support future decisions regarding 
vehicle inventories and life cycle plans. 
4 




A. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE 
Marine Corps doctrine is derived from national level source documents starting at 
the highest level with the National Security Strategy signed by the president of the United 
States. The latest NSS, signed by President Trump in December 2017, identifies the vital 
national interests that must be protected to maintain the United States’ power and influence 
in the world. The NSS identifies five specific threats to these interests: China, Russia, Iran, 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and transnational threat groups (Trump, 
2017). These have been referred to as the “4 + 1” (DeBoer, 2017). It then lays out some 
very high-level strategic initiatives to protect these national interests through foreign and 
domestic policies. National policies seek to employ the nation’s tools of power through 
diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy, better known by the acronym 
DIME. The National Defense Strategy, signed by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, uses 
the NSS to develop what the Department of Defense’s (DoD) strategy will be to combat 
the threats to the nation. The NDS is a classified document, but an unclassified summary 
provides the top-level strategic ideas and goals of the original document. The NDS 
summary states, “Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal 
priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because 
of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security” (Mattis, 2018, p. 4). It also 
identifies three key regions - Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East - in which the U.S. 
must maintain control so as to not allow escalation to open conflict. The NDS is translated 
from strategic level goals to actionable tasks for each of the services through the National 
Military Strategy, also a classified document, signed by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
This document explains how the country will employ the “M” in DIME to secure those 
vital national interests. 
These national-level documents provide each of the services with priorities and 
objectives at the highest level, and in the case of the Marine Corps, facilitate the publication 
of The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) (Neller, 2016). The MOC has two main 
purposes: 1) Describe in broad terms how the Marine Corps will operate, fight, and win in 
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2025 and beyond as an extension of General Conway’s work as published in The Marine 
Corps Vision and Strategy 2025; and 2) Shape our actions as we design and develop the 
capabilities and capacity of the future force (Conway, 2008; Neller, 2016). Since the 
publication of Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1 Warfighting by Commandant Grey 
(1989), later renamed in 1997 as Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 
Warfighting, the Marine Corps has officially recognized maneuver warfare as the primary 
philosophy used to operate and fight. In this publication the Marine Corps defines 
maneuver warfare as, “a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion 
through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and 
rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope,” (MCDP1 Warfighting, 1997, p. 
59). The MOC acknowledges and reaffirms the Marine Corps’ commitment to maneuver 
warfare in stating “[maneuver warfare] was, is and will remain our foundation” (Neller, 
2016, p. 8).  
In support of this foundation, the MOC identifies five critical tasks, one of which 
is as enhancing “our ability to maneuver,” which will be necessary to change how the 
Marine Corps “organize[s], train[s], and equip[s]” (Neller, 2016, pp. 10). The MOC 
specifically discusses the need to maneuver from the sea by closely aligning with the Navy 
and using shipborne platforms to launch combat forces. These combat forces are expected 
to operate in complex urban terrain within littoral regions as the most likely scenarios to 
be encountered (Neller, 2016). The MOC also identifies the minimum agility capability 
level the Marine Corps must maintain as “sufficient protected mobility to support a division 
reinforced and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) requirements,” and that these 
requirements should “take into account the highest-risk challenge against peer or near-peer 
competitors in urban littoral environments” (Neller, 2016, pp.22).  
B. GROUND COMBAT TACTICAL VEHICLE STRATEGY 
In support of the MOC, the Marine Corps has updated the comprehensive long-
term plan, known as the GCTVS, for the acquisition, employment, sustainment, and 
disposal of all ground vehicles, tracked and wheeled, in the inventory (Walsh, 2017). This 
is the first time in three years the strategy has been updated. Lieutenant General Robert 
7 
Walsh, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, signed the strategy 
document on 28 November 2017. The update is in response to the Marine Corps Resource 
Oversight Council (MROC) Decision Memorandum 16-2017 whereby it continues the 
original purpose of the GCTVS in providing a strategic vision for the tactical vehicle 
portfolio with a focus on the amphibian assault capability (Walsh, 2017).  
The GCTVS notes that, “Marines require ground combat and tactical vehicles that 
are afloat ready…designed to be transportable by and integrated with naval shipping.” 
(Neller, 2017, pp. 6). The strategy further requires the portfolio to be responsive to the 
range of military operations while favoring modernization over sustainment of legacy 
systems. As a result, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Armored Combat Vehicle 
(ACV) have been assigned the lion’s share, approximately 71%, of the Marine Corps’ 
modernization budget (Walsh, 2017).  
The Marine Corps’ tactical vehicle inventory must meet characteristics in four 
specific areas (Walsh, 2017): 
1. “Capabilities [must] balance mobility, transportability, protection, and 
lethality attributes” (p. 7). (emphasis added) 
These are the four key characteristics any future vehicle systems must consider, but 
they require clear definitions to be useful.  
Per the DoD dictionary, mobility is, “a quality or capability of military forces which 
permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary 
mission” (DoD, 2018, p. 156). The places in which the Marine Corps is expecting to need 
this capability are “in mountainous, jungle, arctic, desert, and urban operating 
environments” (Walsh, 2017, pp. 3).  
Platforms used in shipping the tactical vehicles like amphibious class ships, 
maritime prepositioning ships, Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels, and USMC-
owned transport aircraft (C-130, CH-53, MV-22) are the basis for defining transportability 
(Walsh, 2017). Measurable characteristics such as width, height, and weight are driving 
factors in determining transportability, as these attributes are what limit a vehicles’ ability 
to be lifted by or fit in an aircraft or ship.  
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The military definition of protection is “Preservation of the effectiveness and 
survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, 
information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a 
given operational area” (DoD, 2018, p. 189). The internationally accepted criteria to 
evaluate effectiveness of protection as it relates to vehicles is STANAG 4569 (NATO 
Standardization Agency [NSA], 2012).1 However, U.S. manufacturers have adjusted the 
testing methods prescribed by the STANAG document and the protection levels are now 
commonly referred to as “MRAP-levels” of protection. These levels are similar to, and the 
MRAP levels are based on, the STANAG levels (Bertuca, 2010).  
Lethality is the vehicle’s ability to support various weapons platforms employed by 
infantry battalions including medium and heavy machine guns as well as missile and rocket 
launching systems.  
2. “Closely managing transport weights and inventory positions – interface 
with connectors, amphibious class ships, maritime prepositioning ships 
(MPS), Military Sealift Command vessels, and transport aircraft (C-17, 
CH-53and M-22)” (p. 7).  
The GCTVS incorporates inventory management both in where the inventory is 
located and what type of vehicles will be maintained at specified inventory levels across 
time. Inventory location must be balanced among the MSC vessels, the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) inventory aboard amphibious ships, CONUS and OCONUS 
storage facilities. 
 
                                                 
1 STANAG 4569 stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization 
Agreement (STANAG) 4569. STANAG 4569 is a classified set of test parameters that define how armored 
vehicles are to be evaluated for resistance to attack. Vehicles are evaluated on resistance to direct fire 
weapons, indirect fire (IDF) weapons, and underbelly mine/IED attacks. The vehicles ability to protect 
occupants depending on proximity to IDF detonations, the caliber of direct fire weapons, or the explosive 
weight of mine/IED attacks determines the STANAG level. STANAG 4569 is categorized into two 
classifications; mine threats and kinetic energy protection. The mine threat protection levels range from 1 
to 4b with the letter M preceding the level. The kinetic energy protection levels range from 1 to 6 with K 
preceding the protection levels. 
9 
3. “Provide capacity to meet and sustain worldwide Marine Corps 
commitments in support of geographic combatant commanders” (p. 7).  
The total number of vehicles within the Marine Corps’ inventory must be enough 
to support the missions required of the Marine Corps by the six geographic combatant 
commanders (GCC). The Marine Corps, like all services, is a force provider to the GCC. 
As part of the Title 10 responsibilities to execute those, “other missions as required by the 
President,” the Marine Corps supplies the personnel and equipment to execute missions for 
the GCCs (United States Marine Corps, 1956). The GCTVS lists the capacity as the need 
to support forcible entry operations by two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. 
4. “Modular and able to incorporate growing technology to meet future 
threats across the electromagnetic spectrum” (p. 7).  
As warfare continues to be executed using more technically sophisticated 
equipment, the tactical vehicles of the Marine Corps must be capable of receiving upgraded 
technology and employing the latest electromagnetic spectrum weapons and defensive 
measures. 
C. TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES 
Within the GCTVS, all ground vehicles, including wheeled and tracked, that are 
used to execute tactical missions are included in the strategy. Tracked vehicles such as 
tanks and armored personnel carriers are referred to as combat vehicles (Walsh, 2017). 
This study only includes the three main wheeled vehicles used for general purpose and 
tactical support to these combat vehicles. The wheeled vehicles included in the study are 
the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected – All-
Terrain Vehicle, and the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle. 
1. High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 
The oldest and lightest vehicle in the GCTVS is the HMMWV, pictured in Figure 
1, which has been in the Marine Corps inventory since the mid-1980s when AM General 
received a $1.2B contract in 1983 (NY Times, 1983). The HMMWV was a replacement 
for the Jeep and had been used as the prime tactical vehicle for everything from troop 
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transport and weapons system platforms to ambulance duties (Seabough, 2017). As a direct 
replacement for the jeep, the HMMWV was never designed nor intended for use as a 
combat vehicle in direct contact with the enemy. However, this platform was used 
throughout Desert Storm and again during the opening years of the OIF/OEF conflicts.  
 
Figure 1. High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle. Source: Jane’s by 
IHS Markit (2018c).  
After the initial invasion into Iraq in 2003, additional armor kits were installed on 
the HMMWVs in response to the lack of survivability during enemy attacks (Solis, 2006). 
Marine Corps officials reported that these upgrades to 1,169 HMMWVs in the Marine 
Corps inventory were delayed due to supply availability; interim armor was installed as a 
stopgap measure, providing ballistic protection but little IED protection. By September 
2004, 1,438 HMMWVs were retrofitted with add-on armor that met the required IED 
protection levels using 3/8 inch rolled homogenous steel (Solis, 2006). While in theory this 
“up-armor” improvement was going to provide additional layers of ballistic protection 
from small arms fire, it did little to protect against attacks from below the vehicle while 
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adding thousands of pounds to the vehicle weight and reducing its mobility (Seabough, 
2017). The additional armor proved to be ineffective against IEDs, and casualty numbers 
began rising leading to increased coverage by the media followed by public demand for 
the military to protect the servicemen and women from this danger (Jacobs, 2007). 
Congress also began to focus on the combat vehicles after receiving reports from 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) authored by Andrew Feickert (2007) and testimony 
from military leaders leading to authorization for the DoD to develop a materiel solution 
in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006.  
There are approximately 17,000 HMMWVs still in the Marine Corps inventory 
with a valid mission requirement. They were never intended to be front line combat 
vehicles, so those valid missions are on bases/stations or in the rear echelon of a 
conventional combat zone. Seabough (2017) noted in his article, “Oshkosh JLTV First 
Drive Review,” that the addition of armor and other equipment over the past 30 years has 
left the HMMWV overweight and underpowered. Arakere, Bell, Haque, Grujicic, and 
Marvi (2009) point out the additional armor designed to provide more protection to the 
occupants significantly undermined the original performance characteristics. They found 
this reduction in performance was particularly acute in off-road performance where braking 
distance was increased as was potential for rollover (Arakere et al., 2009), confirming what 
field experts had known for years as reported by the Associated Press and published in the 
Washington Post in 2006 (Associated Press, 2006). With the addition of armor, the payload 
supportable by the suspension system was also necessarily reduced by the weight of the 
armor leaving the vehicle useless as a troop transport or cargo carrying utility vehicle 
(Seabough, 2017). The development of a new vehicle to replace the HMMWV was 
underway as early as 2006 with the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan fresh on the 
DoD’s mind (Dimascio, 2006). Therefore, the requirement for a lightweight tactical vehicle 
that can provide a comparable level of force protection to the MRAP and the agility of the 
original HMMWV was given to the tactical vehicle industry (Dimascio, 2006). The answer 
was the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  
The HMMWV is scheduled to remain in the Marine Corps’ inventory until 2030, 
with an authorized fielding inventory of approximately 17,000 vehicles. Table 1 provides 
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the predicted inventory requirements as projected in the GCTVS through FY30, which 
illustrate how inventory levels will decrease over time as the JLTV is fielded. 
Table 1. Projected Inventory Levels for HMMWV (All Variants). 
Adapted from USMC (2017). 
 
 
2. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 
As early as 2006, the Army and Marine Corps were exploring solutions to replace 
the HMMWV as was reported by Jen Dimascio for Inside Defense (Dimascio, 2005). After 
a year without complete consensus regarding requirements by the two services, the 2006 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) “encouraged” them to work together in 
finding a common solution (NDAA, 2006). Starting in 2008, the DoD published a request 
for proposal for three tactical vehicle contractors with BAE and NAVISTAR, General 
Tactical Vehicle [a joint venture between General Dynamics and AM General], and 
Lockheed Martin Systems being awarded the technology development contracts (Feickert, 
2017). The contract award decision was protested by Northrop Grumman-Oshkosh and the 
Boeing-Textron teams in November of 2008, stopping work on the JLTV until the protests 
were dismissed by the Government Accountability Office in February 2009 (Censer, 2008; 
Wasserbly, 2009).  
The two-year technology development phase was extended by a one-year delay due 
to changing requirements calling for more under vehicle protection and the cancellation of 
the six-man variant (Bertuca, 2011). This delay forced the engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) phase contract to be awarded in August 2012 rather than 2011, as 
planned (Feickert, 2017). Three companies were awarded the EMD contract requiring each 
company to produce 22 vehicles prototypes for operational testing to last 14 months 
(Feickert, 2017). Following the 33-month EMD phase, the low rate initial production 
contract was awarded to Oshkosh to produce the first 16,900 JLTVs, pictured in Figure 2, 
for the Army and Marine Corps (Gould, 2015). Lockheed Martin protested the decision 
FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
HMMWV 17056 15371 13551 11701 10665 9765 8865 7965 5974 3983 1992 0
Qty per Fiscal Year (FY)
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and caused some contracting delays, but the program is scheduled to be fielded to the 
priority units starting in 2019 (Feickert, 2017).  
  
Figure 2. Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle. Source: Jane’s by IHS Markit 
(2018d). 
Despite the contracting issues and protests, Bill Mooney, an Oshkosh regional vice-
president, said the JLTV is to have better mobility than up-armored HMMWVs yet the 
force protection of an MRAP (Business Wire, 2016). The JLTV developed by Oshkosh has 
focused on three main attributes. Per the brochure available on the Oshkosh website, the 
JLTV provides a “Net ready” connection, a state-of-the-art suspension system, and a fully 
integrated armor protection system (Oshkosh, 2017).  
To meet the needs of the future warfighting environment, the connectivity of the 
vehicle must be adaptable. Oshkosh (2017) claims the JLTV’s communications suite can 
be reconfigured in the field to meet the demands of the mission. It also says the mechanical 
and electrical interface was optimized for quick integration and can operate independently 
or as part of a common communications architecture. While the communications system is 
a very important design of any of today’s vehicles, the protection and mobility were the 
chief complaints of the HMMWV and MRAP. The braking system has also been upgraded 
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to outperform the HMMWV or MRAP. Finally, the JLTV is protected by a fully integrated 
system Oshkosh calls the Core1080.  
While numerous public statements by DoD officials and contractors have declared 
that the JLTV is not going to be a one for one replacement to the HMMWV, the GCTVS 
directly counters these statements: “The HMMWV will be incrementally replaced on a 
one-for-one basis by the JLTV starting in FY19” (Walsh, 2017, pp. 36). The authorized 
fielding strength of HMMWVs is currently 17,056 vehicles and, over the duration of the 
JLTV fielding plan, that number remains as the sum total of HMMWVs and JLTVs 
authorized as shown in 0 (Walsh, 2017). This shows that there is exactly a one-for-one 
replacement plan.  
Table 2. Fielding Plan and Sunset Plan for JLTV/HMMWV. 
Adapted from USMC (2017). 
 
 
The design of the JLTV will come in four variants; general purpose, heavy guns 
carrier, utility carrier, and close combat weapons carrier (Gilmore, 2016). All but the utility 
variant will carry four occupants with the utility variant seating two with a large cargo bed 
in place of the two rear seats. These same three variants will also be able to mount weapons 
systems, although that option is determined by the end user. David Dierson, vice president 
and general manager of joint programs for Oshkosh, noted that the JLTV was designed with 
modularity in mind (Keller, 2017). He said the vehicle is designed to be adjustable according 
to missions now, but also modular with respect to future developments. New technology over 
the lifespan of the vehicle will be able to be incorporated in the vehicle with minor 
adjustments by engineers. The JLTV’s weapon systems supported range from small 
individual weapons to large caliber machine guns. In October of 2017, Oshkosh unveiled the 
FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
HMMWV 17056 15371 13551 11701 10665 9765 8865 7965 5974 3983 1992 0
JLTV
Inct I 0 1685 3505 5355 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500
Inct II 891 1791 2691 3591 3591 3591 3591 3591
Inct III 1991 3982 5973 7965
Total 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056
Qty per Fiscal Year (FY)
15 
automated turret with Hellfire missiles and a coaxial .50 caliber mounted for air defense 
against unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft (Judson, 2017, Keller, 2017).  
The JLTV will have a payload range of 3,500 to 5,100 pounds across the four 
variants (Gilmore, 2016). Additionally, according to the JLTV brochure available on the 
Oshkosh website (https://oshkoshdefense.com) it is designed to have an operational range 
of 300 miles at up to speeds of 70 miles per hour. The suspension system is said to allow 
70% faster speeds off-road with 20 inches of wheel travel. That is four more inches of 
wheel travel than the Oshkosh-made M-ATV. All of this capability fits within a package 
weighing only 14,000 pounds before adding the various armor kits and is required to fit in 
all of the same storage locations aboard amphibious shipping as the HMMWV. There are 
two levels of armor kits, with kit A being the base model and intended for low threat use. 
Level B armor is additional armor that will be attached for higher threat-level conflicts 
providing added small arms, and underbody protection from mines and IEDs (Gilmore, 
2016). 
3. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
Mine resistant ambush protected vehicles have been a controversial topic since their 
inclusion in the Marine Corps inventory of tactical vehicles. The study conducted by Rohlfs 
and Sullivan called into question whether the price being paid for the new MRAPs was 
worth what they concluded was no more effective at reducing casualties than the up- 
armored HMMWVs (Rohlfs & Sullivan, 2013). A rebuttal by Marine Corps analyst F.J. 
Gayle questioned the methodology and conclusions of the Rohlfs-Sullivan study and 
suggested that the vehicles were in fact safer many times over (Gayle, 2013). The Lamb, 
Schmidt, and Fitzsimmons article argued, “that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare 
requirement,” despite the numerous counter arguments they cited throughout their article 
(Lamb et al., p. 76, 2009). One such criticism, cited in their article, was by retired U.S. 
Army General Barry McCaffrey who claimed the MRAP to be the wrong vehicle for a 
situation that was under control (Lamb et al., 2009). Tom Vanden Brook is a journalist for 
USA Today, which chronicled much of this controversy via his articles: Pentagon balked 
at pleas for safer vehicles (Eisler, Morrison, Vanden Brook, 2007); Gates: MRAPs save 
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‘thousands’ of troop lives (2011); Estimate of lives saved by MRAPs lowered (2012); 
Mattis, Marines balked at lifesaving vehicle (2016). The MRAP was originally acquired 
through a rapid fielding acquisition process driven by public outcry, continuous media 
coverage (Vanden Brook, 2007; Gilsinan, 2007; Atkinson, 2007), and congressional 
pressure (CSPAN, 2005) ultimately leading to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in June 
2007, to issue a memo to DoD acquisition officials that the MRAP is the DoD’s number 
one acquisition priority (Rutherferd, 2007). The direction from Secretary Gates resulted in 
the expedited acquisition of the MRAP via the rapid fielding process. These vehicles saw 
some success in combating the IED threat compared to HMMWVs. The inventory numbers 
grew quickly, and the MRAP became a ubiquitous sight on any U.S. installation in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  
This family of vehicles had a variety of makes and models that were used over the 
next decade for a variety of purposes including models from manufacturers BAE, Force 
Protection Inc (FPI), Caiman, MaxxPro, and Oshkosh (Eisler, Morrision, Vanden Brook, 
2007). FPI is the producer of the Cougar family of MRAPs that are still in the Marine 
inventory. They come in two varieties: a 4x4 and 6x6 variant. Both are used for troop 
transport although the 6x6 was originally intended as a delivery vehicle for combat 
engineer missions (Gayle, 2013). It was designated the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Rapid Recovery Vehicle (JERRV) and was specifically equipped to conduct engineer route 
reconnaissance missions (Gayle, 2013).  
The Cougar MRAP is extremely large with the smaller 4x4 version spanning 20 
feet 8 inches, the 6x6 is 24 feet 7 inches in length, and both are just under nine feet wide 
and without a turret or other attachments they stand ten feet tall (Force Protection, 2007). 
When turrets or electronic warfare devices are installed, vehicle heights can exceed 14 feet. 
The 4x4 variant weighs around 34,000 pounds while the 6x6 weighs an average of 45,000 
pounds (Force Protection, 2007). Both vehicles have similar construction with a V-shaped 
hull and armor plating able to uphold the same protection levels.  
In addition to the troop-carrying variants, route reconnaissance and clearance 
(R2C) variants were developed and employed by both the Army and Marine Corps (Gayle, 
2013). The largest of these variants is known as the Buffalo and is a 45,000 – 84,000 pound 
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vehicle with an articulating arm designed to interrogate mines and other buried explosive 
hazards (Force Protection, 2007).  
Another MRAP variant with a very specific task is the Husky. The Husky provided 
mine and IED detection using a variety of ground penetrating sensors. The vehicle’s latest 
variant, the Husky 2G, is a two-man operated vehicle with a driver and a systems operator 
(Critical Solutions, 2015). This concept is very similar to military aircraft with a pilot and 
Naval Flight Officer or “back-seater” that employs all other systems of the aircraft while 
the pilot only concentrates on flying. The Buffalo and Husky together with two R2C 
Cougars and three CAT I Cougars make up a route clearance package and are not 
considered troop transport options although high profile dignitaries have been escorted in 
the Buffalos and Cougars of R2C packages due to the safety, visibility afforded and 
comfort of the passengers (Walsh, 2017).  
Over time, the mobility and maintainability of these MRAPs came into question 
(Bertuca, 2010). These vehicles are extremely heavy with a high center of gravity making 
traversing off-road conditions questionable. Because many missions required off-road 
travel, maintenance of these vehicles became troublesome. The need for a new lighter and 
more agile version was identified. The MRAP-All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), Figure 3, 
was created and began to supplant the existing older and heavier versions.  
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Figure 3. MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle. Source: Jane’s by IHS Markit 
(2018g). 
The M-ATV was designed to be 30% lighter at a curb weight of 24,000 pounds 
(Feickert, 2011). The independent suspension and improved steering provide better 
handling and turn radius giving the M-ATV the ability to negotiate a 30% side slope and 
climb a 60% grade (Oshkosh, 2016). Additionally, it retains the same survivability 
threshold as the MRAP CAT I, II, and III vehicles (Walsh, 2017). The new M-ATVs were 
immediately deployed to Afghanistan in November of 2009 with more than 3,500 in theater 
by June of 2010 (Bertuca, 2010). These improved performance measures are available in 
five variants seating anywhere from four to eleven service members (Oshkosh, 2016). 
Because of the lighter frame and improved power plant and drive train, the M-ATV boasts 
a top speed of 65 miles per hour with an average range of 320 miles (Oshkosh, 2016). The 
improved suspension and reduced weight also give the M-ATV a 4,000-pound payload 
(Oshkosh, 2016).  
And while the M-ATV shows marked improvement over both older MRAPs and 
HMMWV performance they are not completely compatible with amphibious shipping. The 
Marine Corps uses an automated information system called the Integrated Computerized 
Deployment System (ICODES) (Mills, 2013). Embarkation specialists upload the 
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appropriate Marine-Air-Ground Task Force Deployment Support System II (MDSS II) 
data into the ICODES program and it develops an optimized load plan from which the 
specialists adjust to meet mission specific requirements (Mills, 2013). The ICODES 
program shows that the MRAPs fit in all vehicle stowage space on Landing Helicopter 
Assault (LHA) ships while its’ size prevents loading on upper or lower vehicle holds of a 
Landing/Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the lower vehicle hold of a Landing Helicopter 
Dock (LHD) ship. These restrictions prevent the stowing of the M-ATV in two-thirds of 
the available space on a MEU, thus reducing the transportability of the vehicle and limiting 
the limiting the number of vehicles delivered by a MEU. 
 A combination of some legacy MRAPs and the new M-ATVs were placed into the 
permanent vehicle inventory with an expected service life through 2030 (Walsh, 2017). 
Not all of which are assigned to operational fleet units, instead a portion are stored in a 
ready state with other combat items that collectively are known as war reserves. The three 
types of war reserves are stateside depots, overseas depots, and in operational/supporting 
units. The stateside depot is located in Barstow, California. Overseas depots include the 
Marine Corps Pre-Positioning- Norway (MCPP-N), the MEU Augmentation Program – 
Kuwait (MAP-K), and two Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons (MPSRON)s (Haviland, 
2011, Hudson, 2014). MAP-K is a program designed to maintain from 410 to almost 1,700 
MRAP vehicles in an operational status so that they may support theater security 
cooperation activities within CentCom (Hudson, 2014). The vast majority of the MRAP 
fleet are maintained in war reserves around the globe with 844 maintained in MAP-K and 
912 maintained in the stateside depot (Vergenz, 2017).  
 The Marine Corps has published a total MRAP requirement of 2,007 vehicles 
across all variants (Walsh, 2017). That total is subdivided into authorized quantities, as 
listed in Table 3. Using the totals from Table 3, the two war reserve locations contain 85% 
of MRAPS with 10.5% assigned to operational and supporting establishment units. 
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Table 3. 2018 MRAP Inventory. Adapted from USMC (2017). 
 
 
This extended life cycle comes at a cost to maintain an aging and worn out fleet of 
vehicles. Marine officials have estimated that MRAPs cost 86% more annually to maintain 
and operate than HMMWVs (Vergenz, 2017). The operations and maintenance costs 
associated with MRAPs assigned to operational units is $50,000 per vehicle per year, while 
the cost associated with maintaining MRAPs overseas according the KBR Wyle’s report 
of 2017 is approximately $20,000 per vehicle per year (Vergenz, 2017). Maintaining the 
vehicles in stateside depots in a level “A” status where that entails the vehicles being stored 
outdoors without climate control would cost $12,000 per vehicle per year (Vergenz, 2017).  
D. REGIONS AND EXPECTED ENEMY 
Within the NDS, under the heading “Prioritizing preparedness for war,” three key 
regions are identified, “deter aggression in three key regions – the Indo-Pacific, Europe, 
and Middle East” (Mattis, 2018, p. 6). The base assumption for this thesis is that those 
efforts to deter aggression failed in one of the regions and open conflict with the most likely 
enemy is now likely to occur. The most likely enemies as stated in the NSS and NDS are 
China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and transnational terrorist organizations (i.e., ISIS, Al 
Queda) (Trump, 2017; Mattis, 2018). Each of the regions are characterized by distinct 
geographical features that can influence or restrict the use of military tactics and 
equipment. Likewise, the most likely enemy within the region will also influence the type 
of warfare and equipment used to conduct military operations. 
Type TAMCN Qty
CAT I, Cougar D0025 943
CAT I, Cougar, TOW D0040 34
CAT II, Cougar D0027 230
CAT II, Cougar R2C D0051 46
CAT II, Cougar, Ambulance D0023 19




1. Indo-Pacific  
The Indo-Pacific region boasts the greatest percentage of water to land over all 
other combatant commands with many island nations and a large percentage of coastline 
per nation (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2018). This necessarily means that 
movement to any location of conflict will require a ship or aircraft. A conflict in this region 
is likely to center around the two enemy threats of China and North Korea (Mattis, 2018). 
As seen in the Pacific campaign of WWII quite often arriving by ship was the only option 
until airfields on the islands were secured.  
2. Europe  
Europe is a highly developed region with mature infrastructure and a complex road 
network that is modern (CIA, 2018). Some cities have very narrow streets with large 
populations. The landscape outside of cities is rolling hills and forests with mountains 
throughout (CIA, 2018). The associated enemy threat is Russia (Mattis, 2018). Under this 
assumption, the type of weaponry, equipment, and tactics used will be conventional. This 
will drive the use of maneuver warfare on the part of U.S. forces, which requires deadlier 
and more mobile assets.  
3. Middle East 
This region is characterized by underdeveloped infrastructure with a poor road 
network across mostly barren desert landscape (CIA, 2018). It is punctuated by rough 
terrain in the form of mountains and has minimal prominent water features with minimal 








This thesis uses a multi-criteria effectiveness analysis to explore the tradeoffs 
between various attributes in the vehicle’s performance in specified regions. The three 
vehicle types were evaluated using four main objective categories; mobility, 
transportability, protection, and lethality.  
According to Kirkwood (1997) in his Strategic Decision Making: Multi-Objective 
Decision Analysis with Spreadsheets text, multi-criteria effectiveness analysis is a common 
technique used when multiple conflicting objectives exist for a set of alternatives. This 
technique allows an analyst and the stakeholders to place value on individual desirable 
attributes through varying techniques and ultimately calculate a measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) for each alternative that is being considered enabling a ranking of alternatives from 
best to worst. The technique is well-known and used across many industries and disciplines 
such as identifying optimal locations for manufacturing plants (Alam et al, 2015), 
evaluating risk in the cyber environment (Kelic et al., 2013), or in artificial intelligence as 
used by Hsueh and colleagues (2010). However, the commonality among these 
applications is they are used before large investments have been made. The Marine Corps 
finds itself in a position where very large decisions have been made and billions of dollars 
have already been invested by the American taxpayer. To protect this investment the 
vehicles will be used for the duration of the vehicle’s useful life regardless of changing 
threat environments or mission requirements. This research applies a multi-criteria 
effectiveness model in a post-hoc manner using the emerging requirements and identified 
characteristics desired in vehicles to supports the Marine Corps mission.  
A. IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTES 
To begin a multi-criteria effectiveness analysis, the objectives that define the MOE 
and their relationship must be identified. These objectives are called the ends objective of 
the alternative being evaluated. Ends objectives represent the qualities that are important 
in making the decision and are not always directly measurable and may be constructed of 
means objectives and attributes. The relationship between objectives and attributes will 
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produce a chart similar to Figure 4. Each chart will be unique to the decision context and 
could be smaller or much larger depending on the complexity and level of detail required 
for the model. Keeping the model as small as possible while still achieving the level of 
detail required to differentiate between alternatives is critical to avoid “watering down” all 
the evaluation attributes. According to Kirkwood (1997), there are five desirable properties 
to consider when developing an effectiveness model. He lists these properties as 
completeness, non-redundancy, independence, operability, and size. To achieve 
completeness the model must adequately represent and measure the desired qualities 
identified as relevant to the decision. Non-redundancy means the model’s attributes should 
be collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive as described by Kirkwood (1997). The 
independence of the model characteristics is best described as the lack of value interaction 
between evaluation criteria. While the non-redundancy criteria appears similar, it simply 
directs that an attribute cannot be counted twice while independence says the level of one 
attribute cannot influence the value contributed by another. The fourth desirable property 
is the operability of the measures. The measures must be understood by those that will be 
using the model and making the decisions.  














B. DEFINE VALUE FUNCTIONS 
After defining the objectives and attributes that make up the model, the 
measurement scales for each attribute must be defined. An attribute can be measured using 
two types of scales according to Kirkwood (1997): Natural and constructed. Natural scales 
are those scales that are generally accepted and understood by everyone, while constructed 
scales are created to value a specific attribute in a decision (Kirkwood, 1997). These two 
scales can then be further categorized as direct or proxy scales. A direct scale can measure 
the level of performance of an alternative with respect to a specific attribute and be directly 
measured. A proxy scale is used when the attribute cannot be measured and instead is 
replaced by an associated attribute(s) (Kirkwood, 1997). Natural measurement scales are 
preferred and, when available, should be used to reduce the complexity of the model taking 
advantage of the existing knowledge of those performing the analysis and the decision-
makers using the output from the analysis. If a natural scale does not exist and a suitable 
proxy cannot be identified, only then should a constructed measurement scale be 
developed. 
The alternative’s MOE can be represented mathematically by a value function as 
described by Kirkwood (1997). The generic value function V(x) for the system in Figure 4 
with seven attributes (A.1, A.2, A.3, C.1, C.2, C.3.1, C.3.2) will take the form of Equation 
1 as adapted from Kirkwood (1997) in his discussion on value functions. In this value 
function, X represents the measured attribute, v is the value for that measured attribute 
given the best-case attribute measurement, while the w represents the weight of that 
attribute relative to the other attributes. 
 ( )   i i iV x w v x= ∑   (1) 
The values of each measured attribute usually follow one of three types of 
functions. Kirkwood refers to this degree of preference per unit change in the attribute as 
“value increment” (Kirkwood, 1997, p. 64). Values can increase linearly where a single 
unit increase anywhere within the measured range is preferred as much as any other single 
unit increase. Value increases can also be increasingly preferred as values increase or 
conversely, decreasingly preferred as values increase. To determine these value increments 
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for nonlinear functions, an exponential constant ρ can be calculated using the normalized 
midpoint. This ρ is then used in Equations 2 or 3 to generate the value increment v(x) for 
each attribute. Both Equations 2 and 3 are derived by Kirkwood (1997, p. 66). Two 
equations are needed for the two occasions: 1) Equation 2, when the v(x) is increasing with 
an increasing value of x 2) Equation 3, when the v(x) is decreasing with an increasing value 
of x. If the mid-value is the mathematical midpoint then standard normalization techniques 
can be used. 
( ) ( ){ } ( )  1   / / 1  [ –  /{v x exp High x exp High Lowρ ρ= − − −  − −   (2) 
( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }  1 / /[/ 1  –  v x exp x Low exp High Lowρ ρ= − − −  − −   
(3)
 
C. DEVELOP WEIGHTS 
Finally, to complete construction of the model, weights for each attribute and 
objective must be established. Weights represent the comparative desirability of attributes 
or objectives under a common objective. Weights can be determined outright by the 
decision-maker or by using a technique called swing weighting as described by Kirkwood 
(1997, p. 71). 
Once all characteristics in the model have been measured for each alternative the 
final MOE can be calculated. This will produce the MOE for each alternative that will 
allow comparison of alternatives as defined by the measurable characteristics. The MOE 
will be a number from 0 to 1 where the ideal solution would have an MOE of 1 and can be 
used in cost effectiveness analysis. Each alternative will have an associated cost and that 
can be plotted against the MOE for each alternative. The cost can be any measure of 
resources used to gain the system. This cost need not be monetary and can be personnel 
costs, unit cost, annual cost, time cost, etc.  
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IV. ANALYSIS  
To compare the effectiveness of each vehicle operating in specific regions, a multi-
criteria model was used to generate a common quantitative value called a measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) for all subject vehicles. The MOE is a summation of the criteria 
deemed most relevant by Marine Corps leadership and published in the GCTVS. There are 
four main ends objectives listed in the GCTVS that construct the MOE: mobility, force 
protection, lethality, and transportability (Walsh, 2017). Lethality was considered for this 
model and determined to be not applicable to tactical wheeled vehicles as detailed in the 
Chapter III, Section A; Identify Objectives and Attributes. The remaining three objectives 
were divided into means objectives and attributes to most accurately and thoroughly 
represent each vehicle. The model is depicted in Figure 5. The value function for each 
attribute was developed using common maneuver warfare tactics and standard Marine 
personnel and equipment doctrine. Each value was then weighted per each region’s 
characteristics, the most likely enemy’s doctrine, and the preference of decision-makers. 
When each ends objective value for each vehicle was calculated, it was used to construct 
the final measure of effectiveness for each vehicle in each region.  
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A. IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTES  
The ends objectives of the model are mobility, transportability, and protection. 
While it is impossible to directly measure any of these objectives, they do represent the 
critical characteristics of a tactical vehicle as determined by Marine Corps leadership. 
Therefore, each objective is subdivided into means objectives and/or attributes.  
1. Lethality 
To operate effectively in a combat environment, a vehicle must employ the weapon 
systems found in a standard Marine infantry battalion. There are four machine gun 
platforms that the Marine infantry company employs: M2 .50 caliber MG, Mk-19 
automatic grenade launcher, the M240 series medium MG, and the automatic infantry 
weapon or light MG. In addition to the machine guns, the infantry battalion also employs 
a Tubular-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided missile (TOW) system. Each of these 
systems can mount in a standard turret and engage enemy targets while stationary and 
moving as required. The vehicles being evaluated are produced with a turret to 
accommodate these weapon systems and none of them are equipped with additional 
weaponry to distinguish them from the other vehicles. Oshkosh did display a variant of the 
JLTV that employed Hellfire missiles at the 2017 Association of the U.S. Army convention 
and demonstrated a 30mm chain-gun variant in January 2017 in Arizona as reported by Jen 
Judson (2017). However, these variants were designed for employment by the Army as a 
possible substitute for the Stryker and its’ air defense mission. There are no plans by the 
Marine Corps to incorporate this variant into the GCTVS. As a result, lethality is 
determined to be a non-discriminating factor when evaluating these tactical vehicles and 
has been removed from the model.  
2. Mobility 
Mobility is not directly measurable, so some proxy factors must be identified that 
best represents this capability. Off-road and on-road mobility are the two best categories 
that are collectively exhaustive yet mutually exclusive. The most relevant characteristics 
that represent on-road mobility are sustained speed and the vehicle’s range.  
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a. Off-Road 
To adequately represent a vehicle’s ability to remain mobile off-road, three 
attributes were identified. The ability to travel on vertical and horizontal slopes and the 
amount of ground clearance are the largest factors in a vehicle’s off-road capability. Speed 
and power were considered, but not included. Power is included in the slope attributes by 
requiring the vehicle to negotiate slopes without losing vehicle control while still 
maintaining forward progress. Speed was not included because off-road missions are not 
about how fast, but how rough of terrain can the vehicle negotiate. 
b. On-Road 
 Conversely, missions on improved roads do consider how fast the vehicle can 
travel as well as how far it can travel without having to stop for fuel. Thus, the two main 
attributes used to represent on-road capabilities are speed and range.  
3. Transportability 
The U.S. has not fought a war on U.S. soil since the Mexican-American war. There 
are no indications that this will change soon, so the Marine Corps must be prepared to 
transport all equipment needed to a contested location. The degree to which the vehicles 
can be loaded into or on another vehicle and moved determines transportability. However, 
because the transport vehicles do not deliver at the same rate the throughput of these 
transport vehicles must be taken into consideration. Those transport vehicles operate in two 
milieus: air and sea. Therefore, air and sea transport will be the means objectives that make 
up the overall objective of transportability. 
a. Sea 
The sea objective consists of both amphibious class shipping and landing craft 
throughput. Amphibious class shipping refers to the standard MEU; comprised of an LHD, 
LHA, and LPD; from which the Marine Corps projects power into foreign objectives. 
While there are other modes of sea transport including commercial shipping and maritime 
prepositioning ships (MPS), the MEU ships are often the first called upon to deliver Marine 
equipment with smaller stowage compartments. 
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b. Air 
The air objective consists of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft attributes. The 
fixed wing assets capable of moving the tactical vehicles are the C130, C17, and C5. The 
C130 is included as measure of a vehicle’s air transportability because these aircraft are 
owned and operated by the Marine Corps. The C17 is used to represent the U.S. 
Transportation Command assets for global repositioning. 
4. Protection 
When applied to vehicles, this objective is most heavily influenced by the most 
likely enemy to be encountered in the region and their weapons of choice. The protection 
levels associated with each vehicle are measured across five categories addressing specific 
threats to the survivability of the vehicle or its occupants. The attributes that provide a 
complete and exhaustive representation of protection are direct fire, indirect fire, 
mine/IED, reactive armor, and fire suppression.  
B. VALUE FUNCTIONS 
The value functions for the model’s objectives and attributes, Appendix A. Model 
Values, were developed using a variety of techniques. Attribute values like speed and range 
were measurable through direct means and along a continuous scale. Landing craft 
throughput values and others were only measurable through a constructed scale. Other 
values were either binary like CH-53 transportability or step-wise like the STANAG 
protection levels. All attributes regardless of measurement technique or valuation process 
have a minimum, below which differences in the value of this attribute are not meaningful, 
and a maximum value, above which higher levels of the attribute do not add substantial 
value, creating a relevant range. All threshold values and below will be assigned a value of 
zero, while all maximum values and above will be assigned a value of one. Within the 
relevant range for those attributes with scales other than binary a mid-point on the attribute 
scale is identified for which a vehicle is assigned a value of 0.5. Mid-point values for some 
attributes are set at points which coincide with current capabilities of like equipment or 
common doctrinal values. Appendix A. Model Values explains in detail how these 
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values are measured, the critical values, justification for the measures, and the calculations 
to develop the scales of measure.  
1. Mobility 
The mobility definition says that for mobility to be achieved the force must remain 
together to fulfill their primary mission. For that reason, the threshold and objective values 
for each factor are based on the current combat vehicles in the Marine Inventory: M1A1 
Abrams Tank, Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), and the Light Armored Vehicle 25 
(LAV-25) (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018a, 2018e, 2018f). The objective values resulting 
from the largest value of the three combat vehicles and the threshold value being half of 
the objective value or that of the smallest value of the combat vehicles whichever is greater. 
The tactical vehicles evaluated in this study must be able to maintain speed with these 
combat vehicles on roads and traverse similar terrain off-road during an assault to be 
effective as tactical or support vehicles. 
a. Speed  
Overall travel speed is measured on improved surface roads, which include all-
weather dirt roads, in miles per hour (MPH). As shown in Figure 6, the relevant range of 
speeds will be 30 MPH to 60 MPH measured on a continuous scale. The midvalue is set at 
35 MPH because that is the established speed at which the range of a vehicle is determined 
and a common speed at which convoys travel.  
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Figure 6. Value Graph of Speed 
b. Range  
Range is the distance a vehicle can travel on an improved road on one full fuel tank. 
Only internal fuel tanks are used for this measurement. External spare fuel cans are not 
included in the calculation. Shown in Figure 7, the threshold range is 260 miles with an 
objective range of 400 miles measured on a continuous scale. Midvalue for this scale is 
300 miles because that is the common range assumption used during operational planning. 
34 
 
Figure 7. Value Graph of Range 
c. Slope  
The agility of the vehicle to traverse a horizontal slope, shown in Figure 8, and 
forward vertical slope, shown in Figure 9, is a classic indicator of mobility. Each test 
requires the vehicle to maintain forward momentum without rollover. The side slope scale 
is from 20% to 40%. The vertical slope scale is from 30% to 60%. Both scales are assigned 
values along a linear function with the threshold value assigned 0 while the maximum and 
above will be assigned a 1. 
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Figure 8. Value Graph of Side Slope 
 
Figure 9. Value Graph of Vertical Slope 
d. Clearance  
The ground clearance of a vehicle is directly related to the range of mobility in off-
road conditions that it may traverse. Ground clearance is measured from the surface on 
which all the vehicles tires/tracks sit flat to the lowest point on the hull for tracked vehicles 
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or the lowest point of the vehicle on wheeled vehicles (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018d). The 
ground clearance range is from 9 inches to 19 inches, as shown in Figure 10. The midvalue 
is 16 inches, equal to two of the three combat vehicles. 
 
Figure 10. Value Graph of Ground Clearance 
2. Transportability 
Transportability is a necessary ends objective because the tactical employment of 
the vehicles occurs all across the world and there is often a time constraint associated with 
the mission. Because the vehicles cannot always drive themselves either because of water 
obstacles or due to temporal requirements, movement of the vehicles by other means is 
required. Other means in the case of tactical vehicles is through the air or over the sea. The 
vehicles’ capacity for being moved by these other means directly impacts its efficacy in 
supporting missions in the various environments against the expected enemies. 
a. Amphibious Shipping Stowage  
The MOC has reaffirmed the principle of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps’ 
concept of employment. It has further identified that maneuver warfare includes using the 
sea as maneuver space and the integration of the Marine Corps into Navy shipping is 
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critical (Neller, 2016). There are three types of amphibious ships that transport Marine 
equipment: the LPD, LHA, and LHD. Each ship has a vehicle hold that is limited in height 
or access and each has multiple decks of vehicle holds. Amphibious stowage is evaluated 
using a standard MEU/ARG that consists of an LHA, LPD, and an LHD with the attribute 
scale as a percentage of stowage space that is accessible and usable by the vehicle. Figure 
11 shows the relevant range is 50% of the stowage space up to 100% of the stowage space 
must be accessible and usable by the vehicle. The mid-point value is set a 66.67% to 
represent 2 out of 3 of the ships capable of stowing the vehicle. 
 
Figure 11. Value Graph of Usable Amphibious Stowage  
b. Landing Craft Throughput 
Part of using the sea as maneuver space is getting the force ashore. Across the 
surface, this is done via landing craft. Two landing craft that are used to accomplish this 
are the Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) and the Landing Craft Utility (LCU). A 
standard MEU/ARG contains five LCACs and two LCU landing craft. These landing craft 
move at significantly different speeds when delivering cargo. Throughput calculations will 
be completed using Equation 4. The number of landing craft (Ii) are multiplied by the 
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number of vehicles of the given type it can transport (Xi) multiplied by the number 
deliveries the craft can make (Ti) from 25 miles offshore within a 6-hour period. The 
measure is reported in the number of companies delivered in 6-hours with 30 vehicles 
representing a completely motorized company, as shown in Figure 12.  
    a a a u u uThroughput T I X T I X= +   (4) 
 
 
Figure 12. Value Graph of Landing Craft Throughput 
c. Fixed-wing Airlift  
Movement of vehicles and forces worldwide is sometimes required faster than 
shipping can support or movement from one land-based location to another with no need 
to move across the water. An alternative is movement by aircraft where the options are the 
Marine Corps operated C-130 or the Air Force operated C-17 cargo plane. The 
measurement scale is how many vehicles may be transported in each aircraft as shown in 
Figure 13 and Figure 14. These values are necessarily step-wise along the number of 
vehicles within the relevant range. 
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Figure 13. Value Graph of C130 Compatibility 
 
Figure 14. Value Graph of C17 Compatibility  
d. Rotary-wing Air Lift  
Rotary wing options are both Marine operated CH-53 heavy lift helicopter or the 
tilt rotor MV-22 Osprey. Resupply and recovery operations are often carried out by 
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helicopters and that includes movement of vehicles. Each vehicle is assigned a binary value 
depending on its ability to be transported by a CH-53E Sea Stallion or the MV-22 Osprey. 
3. Protection 
The internationally accepted standard for armored vehicle protection levels is 
STANAG 4569. This internationally recognized and accepted standard also provides 
detailed instructions as to how to conduct the testing and under what environmental 
conditions (NATO, 2012). To protect trade secrets and classified military capabilities 
minimum average protection levels were used and compared to desired threshold 
protection level using information gained through open sources and public knowledge. All 
attributes of protection are assigned step-wise values coinciding with the appropriate 
STANAG level within the relevant range as shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Value Graph of Protection Level 
a. Direct Fire  
Protection against direct fire weapons is measured by the caliber of the projectile 
at a specified distance to the target vehicle. These protection levels range from small caliber 
pistol ammunition to large caliber automatic cannons. The direct-fire category measures 
41 
the vehicle’s ability to withstand penetration at single point of impact. The objective level 
for direct fire weapons is STANAG K3.2 
b. Indirect Fire  
Protection against indirect fire weapons is measured by the caliber of the projectile 
and the proximity to the burst. This protection is required to hold from all angles except 
from below the vehicle and measures the resistance to both blast pressure and the kinetic 
energy of irregularly-shaped fragments from the projectiles casing. The protection from 
below the vehicle is measured via a separate scale. The objective level for indirect fire is 
STANAG K3.3 
c. Mine/IED  
Protection against Mine/IED strikes is measured by the explosive mass and the 
location of the blast with respect to the centerline of the vehicle. This category measures 
the resistance to blast pressure from below the chassis. The STANAG scale separates each 
explosive mass category into underbelly shots and shots initiated under any wheel or track 
location. The objective level for mine blasts is STANAG M3a/3b.4 
d. Reactive Armor  
Reactive armor are panels along the vehicle in which there is some reactive 
technology installed to counter rocket propelled grenades and other explosively formed 
penetrating rounds. The value is binary with one being assigned if the vehicle employs any 
reactive armor, zero otherwise. 
                                                 
2 STANAG K3 for direct fire weapons requires minimum protection against 7.62mm armor -piercing 
rounds from machine gun and sniper rifles at a range of 30 meters from all angles. 
3 STANAG K3 for indirect fire weapons requires minimum protection against a 155mm artillery burst 
from 60 meters at up to 30 degrees elevation around the entire vehicle. 
4 STANAG M3a/3b requires minimum protection against mine explosions under any wheel or 
underbelly attacks from an 8kg blast AT mine. 
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e. Fire Suppression  
Fire can be the cause of casualties in vehicles of all types. To account for the 
protection of service members from vehicle fires, a fire suppression system is included in 
the force protection evaluation criteria. The threshold is binary with one being assigned if 
the vehicle contains a suppression system, zero otherwise. 
C. OBJECTIVE AND ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTS 
Weights assigned to the ends objectives are determined using specific 
environmental characteristics and the expected enemy to develop the preferences 
illustrated in Table 4. The weights listed were generated using swing weighting and 
multilinear functions. 
 
Table 4. Baseline Weighting of MOE Criteria per Region 
 
 
Weighting of the attributes represents the desirability of those attributes in line with 
the priorities of the decision-makers. For this model, weights were assumed based on 
doctrinal documents and common tendencies in decision-making. The weights account for 
the regional characteristics and the enemy’s doctrine most likely to be faced in the region. 
1. Mobility 
Mobility is the second highest weighted objective in the Middle East being assessed 
as three times as important as a unit difference in transportability, yet only half as important 
with a unit difference in mobility as a unit difference in protection. While there are road 
networks in the major cities and high-speed roadways connecting most major cities, the 
majority of the region is not developed and requires movement over unimproved roads or 
across open land. A weight of 0.3 was calculated for mobility in the Middle East using the 
Mobility Transportability Protection
Indo-Pac 0.19 0.5 0.31
Europe 0.5 0.33 0.17
Mid East 0.3 0.1 0.6
43 
swing weight technique. Europe on the other hand, has a vast road network and the 
anticipated conflict in the region will require much greater mobility to execute a 
conventional maneuver warfare strategy. As such, mobility is the highest weighted 
objective in Europe with a weighting of 0.5. The terrain dictates a severe constriction of 
mobility in the Indo-Pacific resulting in the smallest weighting for the region at 0.06. 
The mean objectives, sea and air, are weighted based on the region’s terrain and 
infrastructure as well as the current level of access and global pre-positioning of forces and 
equipment. In the Middle East transport by sea is minimally effective because of those 
countries with coastlines almost half are unfriendly toward the United States limiting 
access to surrounding countries. Additionally, ground transport across the Middle East is 
fraught with danger as supply convoys and the like are often harassed or halted due to 
enemy action or terrain restrictions. Air is therefore a more desirable mode of transport and 
is weighted 3:1 for the region. Europe does not pose the same level of risk via sea transport 
with the majority of European nations friendly to the United States with a mature road 
network infrastructure to support transport by the sea. As such, sea and air are closely 
weighted with a slight edge given to sea at a ratio of 5:4 due to the volume possible through 
transport by sea. The Indo-Pacific region requires the use of sea transport at an even greater 
rate than Europe. More than 80% of the countries in the region including the two expected 
threat nations have coastline access. And among these countries, the road network, while 
not as robust as Europe, is still effective enough to support movement from coastal cities 
inland; thus, the weighting ratio is 2:1.  
The weights of the on-road and off-road objectives was supported by the calculated 
road density of each region in contrast to the published Marine Corps mission profile by 
Walsh (2017) in the MOC of 70% of missions occurring off-road and 30% on-road. Road 
density is calculated as the total amount of road network in kilometers divided by the total 
area of the region. The calculation results in a measure of kilometers per square kilometer. 
These measures were collected from the CIA World Fact Book website (CIA, 2018). The 
weights are limited to 90% in either direction because regardless of availability of road 
networks a small percentage of operating time will always be needed in both settings. In 
Europe, the road density is 1.36 km/km2 so a weight of 0.9 will be assigned to on-road. 
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The Middle East has a density of 0.18 km/km2 so a corresponding weight of 0.18 will be 
assigned. The Indo-Pacific region has a calculated road density of 0.66 km/km2 resulting 
in a weight of 0.66. For each region, the off-road weight is 1 minus the on-road weight. 
2. Transportability 
Transportability objective is weighted relatively low in the Middle East with a 
weight of 0.19. In the Middle East, most conflicts will be supplied by overland supply 
routes or commercial movement of equipment as has been seen during the conflicts in Iraq, 
Syria and Afghanistan. Transportability in Europe is weighted 0.31 because when 
employing maneuver warfare on a large scale, movement of forces in relation to the enemy 
is required, and as was seen in World War II the sea can be a very effective maneuver 
space. Since Europe is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean and the North 
Sea, transportability is weighted over force protection. For a very similar reason 
transportability in the Indo-Pacific is the highest weighted objective in the region at 0.5.  
3. Protection 
Protection in the Middle East region is the highest weighted objective of the three 
ends-objectives. Underbelly strikes from Mines and IEDs as well as direct fire attacks from 
RPG and medium machine guns pose the greatest threat to mission accomplishment. This 
extreme threat is reflected in the 0.6 weighting. Conversely, in Europe protection is valued 
lowest at 0.17, not because it is unimportant, but because it is not a requirement to execute 
the expected tactical employment strategy. Protection in the Indo-Pacific is linked with 
mobility. A large majority of the areas in which potential conflict may arise is constricted 
with respect to off-road travel. Because the vehicles are restricted to roads, this produces a 
target rich environment for the use of mines and ambushes necessitating the weighting of 




A. BASELINE SCENARIO 
The input values represented in Table 5 were evaluated using the multi-criteria 
model in Figure 5 as described in Chapter IV. Each vehicle’s input values were applied to 
all three regions resulting in nine MOEs shown in Table 6.   




Figure 16 illustrates the weighted contributions of each of the 16 attributes to each 












HMMWV 45 250 60 40 15.5
MATV 65 320 60 30 16














HMMWV 6.524 100% 3 10 Yes Yes
MATV 2.304 67% 2 4 Yes Yes












HMMWV 3 2 1 Yes No
MATV 3 3 3 No Yes






Figure 16. MOE Broken Down by Attribute Contributionsfor Base Scenarios by Vehicle and Region 
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The attribute values in Table 5 were then applied to the means and ends-objective 
weighting resulting in the MOEs in Table 6. The MOEs are color coded to display the 
rankings within each region with green being the most effective vehicle while red is the 
least for that region. The scores were generated independently of other vehicles in the 
region and independent of the same vehicles’ score in other regions as can be seen by the 
separate tables and charts in Appendix B and Appendix C. The JLTV is the most effective 
vehicle for all regions with a high MOE of 0.95 and a low of 0.77. The result is not 
unexpected as the criteria that shaped this model were derived from the MOC which was 
published well after the HMMWV and MRAP were fielded. Yet, the JLTV’s were still 
being crafted and adjusted to the service needs. Newer equipment, including vehicles, are 
expected to perform better than the previous models.  
Table 6. Baseline MOEs 
 
 
Beyond which vehicle is the best or worst is a more telling statistic; the range of 
efficacy across regions is an interesting measure to note. The difference between the most 
and least effective vehicles in the Indo-Pacific is 0.438 and the Middle East shows a 
difference of 0.507. However, Europe only shows a difference of 0.179. The disparity can 
be explained by the weighting of the objectives for each region and how the size of the 
vehicle and level of armor protection factored in the calculation. In the Indo-Pacific the 
size of the vehicle was critical in determining transportability as 63% of the MOE. 
Likewise, in the Middle East the level of protection was 60% of the MOE. In Europe both 
protection and transportability are muted with both categories combined only impacting 
50% of the MOE.  
The current vehicle fielding plan was evaluated using the MOEs from Table 6 and 
multiplying them by the number of vehicles projected to be in the inventory through FY30. 
Indo-Pacific Europe Middle East
HMMWV 0.714 0.525 0.499
MATV 0.544 0.558 0.755
JLTV 0.936 0.771 0.950
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This overall score was then normalized by dividing by the total number of vehicles in the 
inventory. These normalized regional efficacy scores are located in the table at the bottom 
of Figure 17. All these calculations were made independently from other years and 
independently from other regions in the same year. The three regional scores for each fiscal 
year can then be summed to create a annual efficacy score for that year’s projected portfolio 
mix. The annual efficacy scores can then be summed across time to create the tactical 
wheeled vehicle strategic efficacy score. This score will show the strategy’s effectiveness 
over time as the inventory levels change as projected. It will also be a useful metric when 
comparing to other strategies or during sensitivity analysis. The most obvious trend to note 
is that the overall vehicle efficacy score for all regions increases over time as HMMWVs 
are reduced and replaced with the more effective JLTV. The graph in Figure 17 provides a 
clear visual representation of this trend. It shows the annual efficacy scores in the Middle 
East improve so much comparatively as to move the Middle East region from the least 
effective region for the vehicle inventory to the most effective.  
 
Figure 17. Normalized Regional Baseline Efficacy Scores with Graph 
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
Indo-Pacific 0.6835 0.6835 0.7046 0.7274 0.7506 0.7636 0.7749 0.7862 0.7975 0.8224 0.8474 0.8724 0.8973
Europe 0.5977 0.5977 0.6136 0.6307 0.6481 0.6578 0.6663 0.6747 0.6832 0.7019 0.7207 0.7394 0.7581
















Normalized Efficacy Score Over Time
Indo-Pacific Europe Middle East
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The normalized scores can also be used to calculate the marginal efficacy of a 
vehicle for each region. Marginal efficacy can be determined using Equation 5 for each 
region. The marginal efficacy of the JLTV is .00001254 in Indo-Pacific, .00000940 in 
Europe, and .00002657 in the Middle East. Conversely, the marginal efficacies for the 
HMMWV is the negative of those for the JLTV, because the HMMWV inventory is 
changing in the opposite direction by the same magnitude. The M-ATV does not have a 
marginal efficacy because the inventory levels do not change in the baseline scenario. 
These results suggest the JLTV should be applied to the Middle East first because it 
provides the greatest overall impact to the probability of mission success.  
 ( ) / ( )EfficacyScore Inventory∆ ∆   (5) 
Finally, to account for the likelihood that conflict will occur in specific regions, 
weights for each region were developed using the assessment of security experts. A report 
by the RAND corporation and an interview with former CIA director John Brennan 
estimates military conflict with China over the next 20 years as unlikely, but a conflict with 
North Korea in the next year at 25 – 30% (Dobbins et al., 2011; Woolf, 2017). Conflict 
with Russia is thought to be considerably higher by experts; George Beebe, Michael 
Kofman, and Paul Saunders; at the Center for The National Interest (Majumdar, 2018). 
They place estimates at 50% that conflict with Russia will occur in the near future. John 
Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies believes there is a 30% 
chance of conflict with Iran (Hendin, 2018). However, in the Middle East there is currently 
military conflict involving the use of tactical vehicles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria 
therefore a 100% chance of tactical use in the region. These estimates can be used to create 
the ratio of 1:2:4 with the Indo-Pacific being the base case at a 25% chance followed by 
Europe that is twice as likely at 50% and finally the Middle East is twice as likely again at 
100%. 
Results of these regional probability weights are shown in Figure 18. The blue line 
shows the effect of evenly weighted regions. The orange line shows the weighting as 
estimated by the security experts with the 1:2:4 ratio. This demonstrates that when 
accounting for probability of conflicts within regions the total growth over time increases. 
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The weighted efficacy score starts at 54.9% of desired capability compared to the even 
distribution starting at 60.4% with the weighted scenario ending at 87.6% while the even 
distribution ends at 86.1%. This increase of 32.7 percentage points for the probabilistic 
scenario is much greater than the 25.7 percentage point increase of the evenly weighted 
scenario. The additional growth over time is due to weighting more heavily a region for 
which the JLTV has a higher marginal efficacy.  
 
Figure 18. Scenario Weighting Annual Efficacy Scores 
B. EXCURSIONS 
Chapter V, Section A provides the baseline analysis from which adjustments can 
be made to some of the subjective inputs to the model. This is useful in showing decision-
makers how the model reacts and the direction the outputs move with specific adjustments.  
1. Weighting Adjustments 
Ends objectives’ weighting is among the most subjective inputs of the model. The 
weights and their justification for their values were explained in Chapter III, Section C. To 
determine how sensitive the model is to changes in these parameters the values were moved 
to a more equal weighting while preserving the ordering from most valued (highest weight) 
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to least valued (lowest weight), followed by more extreme weightings, still preserving the 
order. The results can be found in Appendix D. The model outputs of regional vehicle 
efficacy scores will be compared with these baseline scores located in Table 6. 
Additionally, the total efficacy will be evaluated after each adjustment to see whether the 
changes carry through to the final output.  
To begin the analysis, all weights in Table 4 will be centralized by adjusting toward 
the equal weight of 0.33 by 50% as shown in Table 7. In the case of transportability in 
Indo-Pacific, the current weight is 0.5 so 50% of the difference to 0.33 is 0.085. Therefore, 
the new weight of transportability will be 0.5 minus 0.085 to bring the weight closer to 
0.33 for a new weight of 0.415. This method allows evaluation of the portfolio with a much 
more conservative estimate of relative importance of the ends objectives yet maintains the 
relative ranking of the value of the ends objectives. 
Table 7. Centralized Weighting 
 
 
After constructing the centralized weighting scale an extremized weighting scale 
will be developed to observe the model if more exaggerated weights are used. The weights 
in Table 4 will be adjusted, only this time it will be adjusted out toward the end points of 
the measurement scale. All numbers below 0.33 will be moved by 50% toward zero, while 
all weights above 0.33 will be moved toward one by 50%, resulting in the extremized 
weights in Table 8. 
  
Mobility Transportability Protection
Indo-Pac 0.26 0.415 0.32
Europe 0.415 0.33 0.25
Mid East 0.315 0.215 0.465
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Table 8. Extremized Weighting 
 
 
With the new weighting, the model was run again for each set of weights and 
generated Table 9 and Table 10. In each table, an additional column has been added next 
to each region. This column labeled “∆base” shows both the direction and magnitude of 
change from the original weighting scenario.  
Table 9.  Efficacy Scores Using Centralized Weights 
 
Table 10. Efficacy Scores Using Extremized Weights 
 
 
The results for the weighting adjustments were as expected. The extremized 
weights created a larger spread of efficacy scores across a region while centralizing the 
weights brought the regional efficacy scores closer. Because the relative position of the 
weights did not change, the ranking of vehicles across regions did not change. This can be 
accounted for in the magnification of the positive and negative attributes of a vehicle 
canceling the other in a similar manner across all vehicles and regions.  
Mobility Transportability Protection
Indo-Pac 0.095 0.75 0.155
Europe 0.585 0.33 0.085
Mid East 0.15 0.05 0.8
Indo-Pacific ∆base Europe ∆base Middle East ∆base
HMMWV 0.6570 -0.0566 0.5511 0.0261 0.5752 0.0761
MATV 0.5751 0.0309 0.5669 0.0085 0.6793 -0.0753
JLTV 0.9290 -0.0068 0.7768 0.0063 0.9223 -0.0277
Indo-Pacific ∆base Europe ∆base Middle East ∆base
HMMWV 0.8568 0.1432 0.4961 -0.0288 0.4278 -0.0713
MATV 0.4193 -0.1249 0.5455 -0.0128 0.8273 0.0727
JLTV 0.9273 -0.0085 0.7592 -0.0113 0.9750 0.0250
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A more unexpected result was the strategic efficacy scores for each adjustment. 
When summing all the baseline scenario annual efficacy scores across time the resulting 
strategic efficacy score is 27.5 as seen in Table 11. Yet when adjusted towards more 
centralized weighting the score increased by only 0.1 to 27.6 and when adjusted outward 
toward more extremized weighting the score only moved 0.22 to 27.7, in each case 
preserving the baseline assumption of equal probability by region. These are fairly 
insignificant changes over 12 fiscal years. These results suggest that weights themselves 
don’t matter nearly as much as the relative relationship between them.  




To confirm that relative position among weights is more significant than the 
weights themselves, nine random numbers between 0 and 1 were generated and used as the 
weights as shown in Table 12. The strategic efficacy score using these random numbers 
was calculated as 28.1. The relative position of the weights among the vehicles and regions 
were significantly different than those of the baseline scenario. Starting with a random 
number baseline efficacy score of 28.1 the weights were centralized, and the efficacy score 
was recalculated at 27.9. The weights were adjusted outward toward the extremes resulting 
in an efficacy score of 27.9, with a calculated difference of 0.04 not representing a 
meaningful difference in this model. Nearly all calculated differences of these treatments 
occurred at the hundredths or thousandths position very similar to the differences noted in 
Table 9 and Table 10. The fact that regardless of what weights are assigned the strategic 
efficacy score remains very similar as long as the relative position of the the regional 
weights remains constant.  Sampling more than two dozen random weighting scenarios 




Baseline 1.750 1.750 1.831 1.919 2.008 2.058 2.102 2.145 2.188 2.284 2.380 2.476 2.572 27.47
Centralized 1.787 1.787 1.862 1.943 2.025 2.071 2.110 2.150 2.190 2.278 2.367 2.455 2.543 27.57
Extremized 1.782 1.782 1.860 1.944 2.029 2.077 2.119 2.160 2.202 2.294 2.386 2.478 2.570 27.68
Randomized 1.877 1.877 1.941 2.011 2.081 2.121 2.155 2.190 2.224 2.300 2.376 2.452 2.528 28.13
Annual Efficacy Scores
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that created a variety of relative weighting positions resulted in a spread of efficacy scores 
as low as 25 and as high as 31.   
The consistency of the scores following the weighting treatments and the variety of 
scores following the relative position adjustments suggests that decision-makers and 
analysts should be much more concerned with the relative position of the ends objective 
weights within the regions than with the actual weights themselves.  
Table 12. Randomly Generated Weights. 
 
 
2. Policy Adjustments 
Observing the marginal efficacy of the JLTV and the baseline MOEs in Table 6, a 
proposed policy change is to remove HMMWVs from tactical mission support in the 
Middle East. Additionally, replacing M-ATVs with the first JLTVs is part of the scenario 
analysis. Replacing M-ATVs seems counterintuitive; however, given the efficacy of the 
JLTV in the Middle East, this is where the greatest potential impact to the vehicle portfolio 
occurs after removing HMMWVs from the Middle East.   
To begin this scenario analysis, the strategic efficacy score will be recalculated with 
each individual policy change and then again with all policy changes. It will be examined 
in its raw form and will not be discounted for regional conflict likelihood. Using this step 
approach will help to determine how the proposed policy change will impact the efficacy 
score at each step and finally with full implementation. The results of these changes are 
documented in Appendix E.  Scenario Analysis Charts and a summary found in Figure 19. 
Mobility Transportability Protection
Indo-Pac 0.484 0.050 0.466
Europe 0.025 0.414 0.561
Mid East 0.601 0.315 0.084
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Figure 19. Efficacy Scores of Scenario Analysis 
The first policy adjustment is to replace all M-ATVs with the JLTV when enough 
have been delivered for complete replacement.  Because the JLTV and M-ATV are very 
similar in capabilities, maintaining two systems is not cost-effective in a resource-
constrained environment. An optimization tool was used to identify at which point M-
ATVs should be removed from the inventory. For the optimization the M-ATV inventory 
levels were set as the decision variables with the strategic efficacy score as the objective 
function to be maximized. Unconstrained, the optimal point was immediately; however, 
this would not be a feasible solution so that point in time was adjusted to the second year 
of fielding of JLTVs at which time there were enough JLTVs to replace the 2,007 M-ATVs. 
This resulted in a slightly lower efficacy score by 0.3 points over the 12-year fielding 
period. The result is the graph in the upper right quadrant of Figure 19. The change results 
in a total efficacy score of 27.8; an increase of 0.279 over the baseline scenario during the 
relevant range of FY18 through FY30. This is not a significant increase and the overall 
shape of the graph remains similar to the baseline evaluation. However, the fact that the 
adjustment does result in a positive change, regardless of magnitude, suggests that if a cost 
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savings can be realized this policy change should be adopted. This policy change does 
result in a reduced inventory capacity by the 2,007 M-ATVs that are removed and this 
inventory shortage will be addressed in adjustment three of this scenario analysis.  
The second adjustment to be made is a strategic employment decision based on the 
efficacy of HMMWVs in the Middle East. The HMMWV efficacy score of 0.49 is the 
lowest among all the scores generated and as such is lowering the total portfolio efficacy 
score. Additionally, protection is the highest weighted objective in the Middle East region 
and HMMWVs only provide one-third of the desired protection level with an efficacy score 
of 0.21 out of a possible 0.6. Therefore, HMMWVs were removed from the calculations 
for the Middle East representing a policy of not employing HMMWVs as tactical vehicles 
in the region. The result of this adjustment is shown in the lower left quadrant of Figure 
19. There is a significant change in the Middle East trend line in both starting position and 
shape. This policy change shifts the starting efficacy score of the Middle East from 0.526 
up to 0.754. From this new starting position in FY18 the trend line then begins increasing 
and approaches 0.93 by FY30. Over the relevant range this policy change increases the 
total strategic efficacy score to 29.8; a total increase of 2.176 points. 
The final adjustment made for the scenario analysis is to combine these policies. 
Additionally, to account for the loss of inventory capacity after removing M-ATVs, 
HMMWVs were increased by the number of M-ATVs removed to maintain the total 
vehicle inventory at 19,063. There exists a one-for-one exchange because the M-ATVs and 
HMMWVs have the same passenger capacity for tactical missions. In execution this would 
be accomplished by delaying the disposal of 2,007 HMMWVs across the sunset plan 
through FY30. The results are shown in the lower right quadrant of Figure 19. The Middle 
East trendline displays a similar shape as that of the change to HMMWV employment 
policy with one exception; the line accelerates much faster and reaches 0.95, the regional 
efficacy of the JLTV, by FY21. The overall efficacy total of 30.4 increased from the 
baseline by 2.792. This increase is greater than the sum of the two separate policies 
suggesting a positive correlation between the two policy changes. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis examines the Marine Corps’ tactical wheeled vehicle portfolio in the 
context of the future threat environment. Vehicles within this portfolio have received 
criticism and there has been much controversy surrounding the continued use of some of 
the vehicles.  
The portfolio was evaluated using a multi-criteria effectiveness model that 
generated a comparable metric. The model is designed to be flexible and allow decision-
makers to apply the most current threat assessment and risk acceptance levels. These inputs 
can be used to evaluate current strategic policy decisions or forecast the effects of future 
decisions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
1. Primary Research Question 
• Given the current Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy and the Marine 
Operating Concept, what is the proper portfolio mix to be most effective in 
the anticipated threat environment? 
To answer this question a multi-criteria decision model was developed and input 
data gathered from Jane’s by IHS Markit was used to calculate MOEs for each vehicle 
across the three main areas of strategic concern. The ideal portfolio mix would be a 100% 
JLTV inventory. However, given the constraints of vehicle availability Table 13 shows the 
identified inventory numbers that provide the greatest efficacy in the future threat 
environment.  
Table 13. Recommended Vehicle Inventory Levels 
 
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
HMMWV 17056 17056 17056 15558 13708 12672 11772 10872 9972 7981 5990 3999 2007
MATV 2007 2007 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JLTV 0 0 1685 3505 5355 6391 7291 8191 9091 11082 13073 15064 17056
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2. Secondary Research Question 
• Is there a point in time at which the M-ATV or HMMWV will no longer be 
required as a tactical vehicle? If so, when? 
Table 13 displays the inventory levels of all three tactical wheeled vehicles across 
time through FY30. With the implementation of a strategic employment policy of not using 
HMMWVs for tactical missions in the Middle East, the tactical wheeled vehicle portfolio 
achieves the greatest efficacy by divesting from the M-ATVs in FY21 and following the 
current fielding and sunset plans for the JLTV and HMMWV respectively.  
C. OTHER ISSUES 
The largest obstacle to this thesis was the obtainment of official data. Because the 
model includes protection capabilities only open source material were used to estimate the 
levels of protection afforded by each vehicle.  
The objectives have been documented throughout the thesis and where possible 
factual objective measures were used to develop the objectives weighting in the model. 
However, some weights were required to be estimated using prior knowledge and 
experience as well as inferring from the source documents these values even though they 
were not explicitly stated. Only the actual decision-makers responsible for the Marine 
Corps’ tactical wheeled vehicle fleet can accurately assess the true weights.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The model evaluated the current plan and two policy changes which produced 
nearly a 10% increase in efficacy through FY30. This significant improvement in the use 
of the limited vehicle fleet leads to two recommendations: 
1. HMMWV Exclusion 
The HMMWV has long been bemoaned as underequipped for use in the Middle 
East. Local commanders have made decisions at the small unit level to not employ 
HMMWVs “outside the wire.” It is recommended that this be adopted by the Marine Corps 
as a strategic employment constraint and disallow the use of the HMMWV of any variant 
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on a tactical combat mission. This is not to say that HMMWVs should not be in the Middle 
East as they can conduct any number of missions on airfields and bases. In fact, the more 
of these non-tactical missions they conduct the more JLTVs and M-ATVs are available for 
use on the combat missions. 
2. M-ATV Divestiture 
In a resource constrained environment having multiple pieces of equipment to 
execute the same mission is untenable. The public and Congress have already made their 
concerns known through news articles and congressional testimonies. The model has 
shown that the JLTV is far more effective than the M-ATV in every environment. With the 
knowledge that the mission will not be negatively impacted by the replacement of the M-
ATV with the JLTV the only question remaining was when. This was calculated by finding 
the optimal point in the output analysis when the M-ATV inventory could be reduced to 
zero while maximizing the efficacy score of the tactical wheeled vehicles. This point was 
discovered to be in FY21. FY21 should have an authorized inventory of zero M-ATVs, 
3,505 JLTVs, and 15,558 HMMWVs.  
E. POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this model was able to evaluate efficacy of the vehicle strategy using 
objective data and some priority assumptions, it did not incorporate cost. Any future 
implementation of this model should endeavor to add a layer of cost to complete a full cost-
effectiveness analysis. With that added constraint decision-makers could better balance the 
procurement of the expensive optimal solution with that of a sub-optimal less expensive 
one. As an example, this model could be applied to the numerous classes of unmanned 
aerial vehicles in which there are multiple models performing nearly the same functions. 
Likewise, this could be applied to any number of communications, weapon, or defensive 
systems across the DoD in which there are a set of known mission criteria that can be 
effectively represented by system capabilities and attributes. 
To further this model a layer of vehicle operating costs could be added to determine 
the cost-effectiveness ratio for the tactical wheeled vehicles. This future research could use 
the efficacy scores generated from this thesis and the associated operating costs for the 
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tactical wheeled vehicles to rank and prioritize the vehicles employment by region. That 
solution could then be evaluated against the Marine Corps’ financial limitations and 
responsibilities to confirm or amend the recommendations of this thesis. 
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APPENDIX A.  MODEL VALUES 
 
  
Attribute How its measured Critical values Justificiation
side slope The vehicle's performance will be measured in % slope .  It 
must travel on a dry hard surface perpendicular to a side 




A common specification cited for all tactical 
vehicles and included as a requirement in critical 
design reviews.  CVs are developed using the 
minimum and maximum values achieved by the 
three combat vehicles M1A2 tank, LAV, AAV
vertical slope The vehicle's performance will be measured in % slope .  It 
must travel on a dry hard surface perpendicular to a side 




A common specification cited for all tactical 
vehicles and included as a requirement in critical 
design reviews.  CVs are developed using the 
minimum and maximum values achieved by the 
three combat vehicles M1A2 tank, LAV, AAV
clearance
The distance measured, in inches, from the gound to the 




A common specification cited for all tactical 
vehicles and included as a requirement in critical 
design reviews.  CVs are developed using the 
minimum and maximum values achieved by the 
three combat vehicles M1A2 tank, LAV, AAV
speed
The maximum speed, in average miles per hour, attainable 




A common specification cited for all tactical 
vehicles and included as a requirement in critical 
design reviews.  CVs are developed using the 
minimum and maximum values achieved by the 
three combat vehicles M1A2 tank, LAV, AAV
range Maximum distance, measured in miles, achieved on a single 





A common specification cited for all tactical 
vehicles and included as a requirement in critical 
design reviews.  CVs are developed using the 
minimum and maximum values achieved by the 
three combat vehicles M1A2 tank, LAV, AAV
Amphibious ship 
stowage
The percentage of hold space in an ARG/MEU consisting of 




The MOC/GCTVS directs the use of the sea as 
maneuver space and as a way of delivering forces 
in support of integrating with Naval Forces. 
(GCTVS pp. 4, MOC pp. 10) ICODES determines the 
ability to fit in various hold spaces
Landing Craft 
throughput
Throughput, reported in the number of companies, is the 
sum of the total inventory (I) of two landing craft, LCAC (a) 
and LCU (u), per MEU/ARG multiplied by the trips per unit 
time (T) and number of vehicles it can hold (X) respectively.  
Where the trips/time is measured using a 25 mile swim over 
a 6 hour total period. 
 The formula:  Throughput = TaIaXa + TuIuXu
High: 5
Low: 1
The MOC/GCTVS directs the use of the sea as 
maneuver space and as a way of delivering forces 
in support of integrating with Naval Forces. 
(GCTVS pp. 4, MOC pp. 10) ICODES determines the 
ability to fit in various hold spaces.  
C130 throughput Vehicle specifications and aircraft capabilities are used to 




The GCTVS specifies that vehicles must support 
strategic deployment via transport aircraft (pp. 7)
C17 throughput Vehicle specifications and aircraft capabilities are used to 




The GCTVS specifies that vehicles must support 
strategic deployment via transport aircraft (pp. 7)
CH-53
Binary, assign 1 if the vehicle can be transported by the 
aircraft.  Zero otherwise.
GCTVS states all new vehicles need to be 
transportable by CH-53 or MV-22 (pp. 6-7)
MV-22
Binary, assign 1 if the vehicle can be transported by the 
aircraft.  Zero otherwise.
GCTVS states all new vehicles need to be 
transportable by CH-53 or MV-23 (pp. 6-7)
the vehicle must resist penetration by a prescribed round at 
a calculated angle of attack with a 90% statistical confidence 
level measured in STANAG levels K 1-6
AEP-55 Volume 1-5 specify the procedures to test 
direct fire protection meeting the requirements 
listed in  the NATO STANAG 4569
the vehicle must resist penetration by a prescribed round at 
a calculated angle of attack with a 90% statistical confidence 
level measured in STANAG levels K 1-6
AEP-55 Volume 1-5 specify the procedures to test 
for indrect fire protection meeting the 
requirements listed in  the NATO STANAG 4569
The vehicle must resist penetration by a prescribed 
underbelly attack at a calculated net explosive weight with a 
90% statistical confidence level measured in STANAG levels 
M 1-4
AEP-55 Volume 2 and 3 specify the procedures to 
test for mine/IED protection meeting the 
requirements listed in the NATO STANAG 4569
Binary, assign 1 if the vehicle's armor plan uses reactive 
armor.  Zero otherwise
Reactive armor combats EFP rounds commonly 
found in armor piercing artillery and RPGs as well 
as tank rounds.
Binary, assign 1 if the vehicle has a passive fire suppression 
system installed.  Zero otherwise
A common specification cited for all tactical 
vehicles and included as a requirement in critical 
design reviews
STANAG Lvl (K or M)    v(x)
        0                             0
        1                            .1
          2                            .33































X 17 X Y
midvalue 16 9 0
High 19 11 0.085731
Low 9 13 0.208656
Norm Mvalue 0.7 15 0.384911
Rho -5.55 17 0.637634





midvalue 35 X Y
High 60 30 0
Low 30 35 0.5
Norm Mvalue 0.166666667 40 0.7541
Rho 7.4 45 0.88361
R 0.246666667 50 0.94945
v increasing 0.499861019 55 0.98295





Y(x) = .05x - 1
Y(x) = .033x -1
Y(x) = (1-EXP(-(x-9)/-5.55))/(1-EXP(-(19-9)/-5.55))
Midvalue equals the 
mathematical average so 
values are distributed linearly
Midvalue equals the 
mathematical average so 
values are distributed linearly
Midvalue is equal to two of 
the three combat vehicles at 
16 inches
Midvalue is equal to the 
average speed used in the 



























































































midvalue 300 X Y
High 400 260 0
Low 260 300 0.5
Norm Mvalue 0.285714286 350 0.835524










midvalue 0.667 X Y
High 1 0.5 0
Low 0.5 0.6 0.379992
Norm Mvalue 0.334 0.7 0.635398
Rho 0.2517 0.8 0.807064








LCAC HMMWV MATV JLTV
Trips 2.875 2.875 2.875 X(Co) Y
inventory 5 5 5 1 0
capacity 12 4 8 2 0.2
3 0.75
LCU 4 0.95
trips 1.161290323 1.16129 1.16129 5 1
inventory 2 2 2
capacity 10 5 8
Throughput 196 69 134
Marines 782.9032258 276.4516 534.3226
Co 6.524193548 2.303763 4.452688
Bn 1.957258065 0.691129 1.335806





2 vehicles together provide the bulk of a 
squad's capabilities while the third can 
complete a squad and offer more tactical 
options
3 companies provide 75% of the capability of a 5-company battalion.  The last 
company worth of Marines are non-essential support Marines that provide a small 
percentage of the battalion's combat capability
Total Capacity
Midvalue is set at the common 
planning factor for military 
operations at 300 miles
Midvalue is .667 representing 










































































































Stanag level 3 is the target level of 
protection.
Each previous level is less desired at a 3:1 
ratio
2 of 3 squads provide the bulk of the 
platoon's capability and adding the final 
mounted squad completes the platoon 







































# of vehicles transported by C17
C17
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HMMWV-IP 0.1476 0.0000 0.1670 0.3340 0.2195 0.8000 0.2000 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.0439 0.0400 0.133 0
HMMWV-Eu 0.1476 0.0000 0.1670 0.3340 0.2195 0.2500 0.7500 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.0943 0.0214 0.1428 0
HMMWV-ME 0.1476 0.0000 0.1670 0.3340 0.2195 0.8000 0.2000 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2000 0.0165 0.0400 0.1 0
MATV-IP 0.1670 0.5530 0.1670 0.1670 0.2495 0.1600 0.1124 0.0850 0.0640 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.1330 0.4000 0 0.0680
MATV-Eu 0.1670 0.5530 0.1670 0.1670 0.2495 0.0500 0.4215 0.0850 0.0640 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.2857 0.2142 0 0.0716
MATV-ME 0.1670 0.5530 0.1670 0.1670 0.2495 0.1600 0.1124 0.0850 0.0640 0.1300 0.0600 0.2000 0.0500 0.4000 0 0.2500
JLTV-IP 0.1670 0.6960 0.1670 0.3340 0.4005 0.7600 0.2000 0.0850 0.5600 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.1330 0.4000 0.1330 0.0680
JLTV-Eu 0.1670 0.6960 0.1670 0.3340 0.4005 0.2375 0.7500 0.0850 0.5600 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.2857 0.2142 0.1428 0.0716


























IP Base 0.1670 0.8330 0.1670 0.3340 0.4990 0.8000 0.2000 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.1330 0.4000 0.1330 0.0680
HMMWV-IP 0.1476 0.0000 0.1670 0.3340 0.2195 0.8000 0.2000 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.0439 0.0400 0 0
MATV-IP 0.1670 0.5530 0.1670 0.1670 0.2495 0.1600 0.1124 0.0850 0.0640 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.1330 0.4000 0 0.0680
JLTV-IP 0.1670 0.6960 0.1670 0.3340 0.4005 0.7600 0.2000 0.0850 0.5600 0.1300 0.0600 0.2660 0.1330 0.4000 0.1330 0.0680
Eu Base 0.1670 0.8330 0.1670 0.3340 0.4990 0.2500 0.7500 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.2857 0.2142 0.1428 0.0716
HMMWV-Eu 0.1476 0.0000 0.1670 0.3340 0.2195 0.2500 0.7500 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.0943 0.0214 0 0
MATV-Eu 0.1670 0.5530 0.1670 0.1670 0.2495 0.0500 0.4215 0.0850 0.0640 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.2857 0.2142 0 0.0716
JLTV-Eu 0.1670 0.6960 0.1670 0.3340 0.4005 0.2375 0.7500 0.0850 0.5600 0.1300 0.0600 0.2857 0.2857 0.2142 0.1428 0.0716
ME Base 0.1670 0.8330 0.1670 0.3340 0.4990 0.8000 0.2000 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2000 0.0500 0.4000 0.1000 0.2500
HMMWV-ME 0.1476 0.0000 0.1670 0.3340 0.2195 0.8000 0.2000 0.1700 0.6400 0.1300 0.0600 0.2000 0.0165 0.0400 0 0
MATV-ME 0.1670 0.5530 0.1670 0.1670 0.2495 0.1600 0.1124 0.0850 0.0640 0.1300 0.0600 0.2000 0.0500 0.4000 0 0.2500
















































































Ends Objective by Vehicle and Region
IP Base HMMWV-IP MATV-IP
JLTV-IP Eu Base HMMWV-Eu
MATV-Eu JLTV-Eu ME Base
HMMWV-ME MATV-ME JLTV-ME
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FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
HMMWV 17056 17056 15371 13552 11701 10665 9765 8865 7965 5974 3983 1992 0
MATV 2007 2007 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JLTV 0 0 1685 3505 5355 6391 7291 8191 9091 11082 13073 15064 17056
19063 19063 19063 17057 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056 17056
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
Indo-Pacific 0.69581 0.69581 0.71545 0.75929 0.78339 0.79688 0.80860 0.82032 0.83204 0.85796 0.88389 0.90982 0.93576
Europe 0.52846 0.52846 0.55016 0.57540 0.60205 0.61696 0.62992 0.64288 0.65584 0.68451 0.71317 0.74184 0.77052
Middle East 0.52601 0.52601 0.56586 0.59176 0.64067 0.66805 0.69185 0.71564 0.73943 0.79206 0.84470 0.89733 0.94999
Total 1.75028 1.75028 1.83147 1.92645 2.02610 2.08189 2.13036 2.17883 2.22730 2.33453 2.44176 2.54899 2.65627 27.88452










FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
HMMWV 17056 17056 15371 13552 11701 10665 9765 8865 7965 5974 3983 1992 0
MATV 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
JLTV 0 0 1685 3505 5355 6391 7291 8191 9091 11082 13073 15064 17056
19063 19063 19063 19064 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
Indo-Pacific 0.69581 0.69581 0.71545 0.73665 0.75821 0.77028 0.78076 0.79125 0.80173 0.82493 0.84813 0.87132 0.89453
Europe 0.52846 0.52846 0.55016 0.57361 0.59744 0.61079 0.62238 0.63398 0.64557 0.67122 0.69687 0.72252 0.74818
Middle East 0.75465 0.75465 0.84380 0.87886 0.89673 0.90330 0.90782 0.91154 0.91466 0.92004 0.92399 0.92702 0.92942
1.97892 1.97892 2.10941 2.18912 2.25238 2.28437 2.31097 2.33677 2.36197 2.41619 2.46899 2.52087 2.57214 29.78100























FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
HMMWV 17056 17056 17056 15558 13708 12672 11772 10872 9972 7981 5990 3999 2007
MATV 2007 2007 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JLTV 0 0 1685 3505 5355 6391 7291 8191 9091 11082 13073 15064 17056
19063 19063 20748 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063 19063
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
Indo-Pacific 0.69581 0.69581 0.71530 0.75449 0.77604 0.78812 0.79860 0.80909 0.81957 0.84277 0.86597 0.88916 0.91237
Europe 0.52846 0.52846 0.54812 0.57009 0.59393 0.60727 0.61887 0.63046 0.64206 0.66771 0.69336 0.71901 0.74467
Middle East 0.75465 0.75465 0.84380 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999 0.94999
1.97892 1.97892 2.10722 2.27457 2.31996 2.34538 2.36746 2.38954 2.41162 2.46046 2.50931 2.55816 2.60703 30.30853
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